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Internationally, there has been a steady increase in the number of countries instigating charity 
regulation. While the Charity Commission for England and Wales was established by the Charitable 
Trusts Acts of 1853, since 2005 the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, Charity Commission for 
Northern Ireland and the Singaporean Charity Council were established almost contemporaneously 
with New Zealand’s Charities Commission. In other countries (such as Canada and the United States) 
tax authorities register and monitor charitable activity leading to a perception that charities need 
regulation if the donating public's trust and confidence is to increase. 
Public interest theory suggests that regulation increases organisational transparency through 
reducing information asymmetry, protects (or encourages) a competitive market, leading to a 
distribution of resources which is in the public interest (Gaffikin, 2005).  While these arguments are 
commonly used to call for regulation in the private (for profit) sphere, nonetheless they may explain 
the increase in the number of bodies regulating charities internationally.  
Notwithstanding a need for regulation, the cost of complying with these regimes is often an issue, 
especially for small and medium-sized charities and therefore regulator tend to take a light-handed 
approach to small and medium charities' information provision (for example, Hind, 2011; Morgan, 
2010a). Responding to the call by Hyndman and McDonnell (2009) for research into charities 
regulation, its rationale and operation, this paper ascertains the impact of a light-handed 
enforcement regime on small and medium charities' reporting. In so doing, it analyses the General 
Purpose Financial Reporting (GPFR) practices of a selection of 300 small and medium-sized charities 
registered with the New Zealand Charities Commission against the Charities Act requirements and 
hence the rationale for this regulator. It uses this analysis to predict how the regulator's activities 
might impact future reporting practices of charities. 
Key Words: Charity regulation, charity reporting, charity compliance. 
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Light-handed charity regulation: its effect on reporting practice in New 
Zealand. 
 
1. Introduction 
Internationally, there has been a steady increase in the number of countries instigating charity 
regulation. As examples of independent regulators, the Charity Commission for England and Wales 
was established by the Charitable Trusts Acts of 1853 and regulates over 160,000 charities, while 
since 2005 the much smaller Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, Charity Commission for 
Northern Ireland and the Singaporean Charity Council were established almost contemporaneously 
with New Zealand’s Charities Commission. In other countries (such as Canada and the United States) 
tax authorities register and monitor charitable activity. Charity watchdogs [such as GuideStar and 
Better Business Bureau’s (BBB’S) Wise Giving Alliance] have also established in recent years. As Szper 
and Prakash (2011, p.116) note “there is a perception, correct or incorrect, that nonprofits have 
transparency issues” and therefore that regulation is required to improve charities' transparency 
and accountability.  
Public interest theory suggests that regulation increases transparency through reducing information 
asymmetry, protects (or encourages) a competitive market and leads to a distribution of resources 
which is in the public interest.  While these arguments are commonly used to call for regulation in 
the private (for profit) sphere, nonetheless they may explain the increase in the number of bodies 
regulating charities.  
Such regulators typically require charities to disclose financial and other information in the belief 
that information asymmetry gives rise to the potential for opportunism in charities and other not-
for-profit organisations due to the lack of ‘owners’ (Desai & Yetman, 2005). Indeed, Desai and 
Yetman (2005) found that US regulatory requirements for charities to return financial information 
leads to lower compensation of officers and directors and thus, maximises funds available for 
charitable distribution.  Regulating increased charity information may therefore build the donating 
public's trust and confidence (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009).  
Notwithstanding a need for regulation, the cost of complying with these regimes is often an issue, 
especially when small and medium-sized charities must increase their reporting. While regulators 
require large charities to comply with minimum reporting standards, they tend to take a light-
handed approach to small and medium charities' information provision (for example, Hind, 2011; 
Morgan, 2010a). 
Responding to the call by Hyndman and McDonnell (2009) for research into charities regulation, its 
rationale and operation, the objective of this paper is to ascertain the impact of a light-handed 
enforcement regime on small and medium charities' reporting. In so doing, it analyses the General 
Purpose Financial Reporting (GPFR) practices of a selection of charities registered with the New 
Zealand Charities Commission against the Charities Act requirements and hence the rationale for this 
regulator. It uses this analysis to predict how the regulator's activities might impact future reporting 
practices of charities. 
The paper proceeds as follows: first the rationale for charities' regulation and reporting is provided 
and tested against the oldest charity regulator (the Charity Commission of England and Wales). In 
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section three the New Zealand context is described and the research design presented. Following 
the research results, the paper continues with a discussion and conclusion, including limitations and 
opportunities for further research. 
2. Regulation in the charities sector 
2.1 The impetus to regulate 
A number of theories of regulation and the fact that the need and imposition of regulation is both 
contextually and temporally specific, make discussions of regulation complex (Gaffikin, 2005). A 
prominent regulation theory rises from concerns that private interest will outweigh the public 
interest in business operations and that, due to information asymmetry, regulation is needed to 
protect the public interest. Public interest theory suggests a regulator will facilitate activities in the 
private sphere to: (i) address information asymmetries in a manner equitable both to the regulated 
(preparer of the information) and to the users of the information, and (ii) to maintain an 
environment which encourages competition and fair distribution of resources (Gaffikin, 2005). 
Within such a regime, regulators are expected to set minimum standards, increase the amount of 
publicly available information and enhance comparability across entities (Brown, 1990).  
These arguments may also be adapted to explain regulation in the private charity sphere. High 
information asymmetry exists due to the prevalence of unreciprocated (non-exchange) contributions 
to charities (Falk, 1992) and due to the lack of ownership (Desai & Yetman, 2005). Accordingly, for 
example, the UK Charities Act 2006 requires the Charity Commission in England and Wales to 
(amongst others) 'inspire public trust and confidence in charities' and to 'enhance the accountability 
of charities to donors, beneficiaries and the general public'. The Charity Commission enhances 
accountability by careful attention to information asymmetries of these users (donors, beneficiaries 
and the general public) and reports that public trust and confidence in charities continues to 
increase (Hind, 2011).  
Notwithstanding regulators’ intentions to enhance accountability, incidences of fraud continue to 
occur as shown by Fremont and Kosaras (Fremont-Smith & Kosaras, 2003). Further, poor reporting 
by charities leads to a lack of transparency (as shown in section 2.3). 
Regulation can also be developed to maintain competition in certain markets (Gaffikin, 2005). 
Competition is encouraged due to the belief that it will result in effective and efficient use of scarce 
resources both of those who pay for a market-provided service or good, and within the organisation 
that provides it. Further, regulation within a competitive market can lead to more just distribution of 
resources (Gaffikin, 2005). Potentially this rhetoric of the efficient market may be observed in charity 
regulation. For example, the UK Charities Act 2006 requires the Charity Commission in England and 
Wales to (amongst others) 'promote the effective use of charitable resources'. The manner in which 
the Charity Commission makes  information available about large charities on its website, and the 
UK government's sponsorship of an information website (GuideStar) (see Dhanani, 2009) provide 
evidence of the regulator's desire to encourage competition in the charities market which may also 
lead to the more fair distribution of resources throughout the sector. This is all the more important, 
suggest Hyndman and McMahon (2011), due to the increasing amounts of government funding into 
the charities sector (especially for the provision of social services). Hind (2011) also notes that a role 
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of the Charity Commission of England and Wales has been to promote public interest in charity, and 
this also speaks of the creation of a market.  
Not all agree that public interest theory can explain regulation, as the term 'public interest' is ill-
defined and these theories do not sufficiently consider the competence and independence of the 
regulator (Gaffikin, 2005).  This is not such an issue in the charity case, as the public interest has 
been defined by statute ('promoting public trust and confidence in charities'), although it is 
recognised that robustly measuring trust and confidence can be difficult.  
Further, the vision of the Charity Commission in England and Wales notes it is to be 'the 
independent regulator for charitable activity...' Its independence ensures that interest groups 
(including government, charities themselves and, to a lesser extent the public) cannot capture the 
regulator. Independence also means that the regulator will sanction charities' short-comings by de-
registration and, in extreme cases, convictions through the court process. Thus, the regulator's 
process needs to be open, transparent, accountable and acceptable.  
Self-regulatory regimes are frequently criticised due to a lack of independence (perceived or 
otherwise) (Gaffikin, 2005) and accordingly self regulation in the charities sector has occurred only 
infrequently and has experienced only limited success (Cordery & Baskerville, 2007). It may also not 
be popular with a diverse sector. Cordery and Baskerville (2007) note that when the New Zealand 
government consulted on the need or otherwise for a Charities Commission (in its 'Tax and Charities' 
review of 2001) a majority of the 1682 submissions supported or accepted the need for an external 
regulator of the charitable sector, rather than arguing for self-regulation instead.  
Charities’ regulators tend to use compliance approaches to encourage and educate charities rather 
than enforcing requirements through deterrence approaches. A compliance approach is flexible and 
less confrontational (Gaffikin, 2005), as can be observed with the Charity Commission in England and 
Wales which viewed its role in the early 21st century, as "being akin to regulating angels" (Hind, 2011, 
p.202). The benefits of a compliance approach are that regulation can be carried out more efficiently 
and therefore with less cost. Yet, compliance approaches are more susceptible to being captured by 
interest groups and may lead to a lack of sufficient regulatory resources (Gaffikin, 2005). Compliance 
monitoring is evident from the manner in which charities regulators assume an education role.  
Regulation requires charities to disclose financial and also non-financial information as to the 
difference they make within communities to meet users’ needs for accountability and for decision-
making about future donations and relationships with charities. Both charity reporting users and 
their needs are potentially many and varied. In the United Kingdom (UK), Bird and Morgan-Jones 
(1981) asserted that there are six user types. The New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants’ 
(2007) Not-for-Profit Financial Reporting Guide lists 13 different users who will rely on charities' 
GPFRs for information. Users may be internal, may provide resources to the organisation, and/or 
seek accountability for external support such as tax relief.  
2.2 Arguments against regulation 
Not all users will seek information from a public register and therefore it could be argued that 
regulation is not required. For some donors the 'warm glow' of giving (Andreoni, 1998) will be 
sufficient, making them less likely to make enquiries as to charities' performance. Hyndman and 
McDonnell (2009) suggest that donors to street collections are likely to be in this category. Other 
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users may be able to demand special purpose reports from a charity (for example, philanthropic 
trusts and other grant makers) (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009).  
Further, charities perceive regulation in general, and financial regulation in particular, to be a burden 
(Burt & Taylor, 2004). As well as the direct and indirect costs of regulation, some charities may not 
be aware of regulatory requirements, and others may lack expertise (Burt & Taylor, 2004). For 
example, research following the passing of the Charities Act 1993 in England and Wales, found its 
imposition of reporting requirements led to a number of charities' volunteer administrators and 
treasurers leaving their jobs (Morgan, 2008). Although large charities are often professionalised and 
likely to meet (and exceed) reporting requirements (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009), conversely, 
small charities may utilise their community links to communicate success, rather than formal GPFR. 
Thus the benefits charities and the public receive from reporting to a standard must outweigh the 
costs.  
Yet, costs of information preparation are difficult to measure and the economic benefits of 
enhanced information is even more so (Brown, 1990). In respect of the Charity Commission of 
England and Wales, Fries (2003) explained they required a framework to encourage transparent 
reporting that was commensurate to the charity's size and also the public interest. Hind (2011) 
confirmed that the Charity Commission sought to take into account the regulatory burden on 
smaller charities and has simplified its forms and reduced disclosure requirements for small and 
medium-sized charities. 
Further, charity regulators may operate unsuccessfully when they do not have clear policy goals 
(Breen, 2009). Breen (2009), in her analysis of fundraising regulation, notes that there are a number 
of models that could be used and that specific models may work best at different parts of the 
fundraising process. Extrapolating this theory to charity regulation in general suggests that, unless 
the regulator has considered all aspects of the specific activity being regulated, charities may bear 
regulatory costs unnecessarily if the regulator does not recognise the consequences of its actions.   
An important aspect of regulation costs is the reporting requirement. Charity reporting practice has 
been shown to be deficient, with shortcomings in charities’ GPFR being highlighted in, for example, 
the United Kingdom (UK) and North America as shown in the following section. Further, while the 
development of charity-specific standards to guide charity preparers has advanced in England and 
Wales (Hind, 2011), it remains underdeveloped in other countries, such as New Zealand (Cordery & 
Baskerville, 2007). 
2.3 Charity-specific reporting 
From 1960 English and Welsh charities were legally required to file GPFR, yet Bird and Morgan-Jones 
(1981) found that charity reporting was extremely diverse, reducing transparency and accountability. 
During this period the Charity Commission of England and Wales lacked resources and the 
accounting framework was not charity-specific.  
While initially they had supported diversity in practice, Bird and Morgan-Jones (1981) found such 
severe inconsistencies in charity GPFR that they argued strongly for founding principles to be 
established and regulation to encourage compliance. From 1988 a Statement of Recommended 
Practice (SORP) could be used by charities to prepare their GPFR. However, a decade after the 
release of the SORP, Williams and Palmer (1998) explained that charities were ignorant of the SORP, 
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while Palmer and Vinten (1998) and Connolly and Hyndman (2001) confirmed that poor GPFR was in 
effect encouraged by the failure of auditors to issue qualified audit reports on non-compliant GPFR. 
Alternatively, Hines and Jones (1992) argued that the voluntary nature of reporting was the most 
likely reason for non-compliance and poor reporting practices. While complying with the SORP 
remains voluntary for smaller charities (with income <£25,000), it became mandatory from 1992 for 
medium and large charities, and this eventually drove compliance (Hyndman & McMahon, 2011). 
Further, the SORP is regularly updated to ensure it does not digress too markedly from UK GAAP as it 
is applied to the public sector, given the similarity of these organisations to charities (Hyndman & 
McMahon, 2011) and to ensure comparability. Practices have since improved markedly, however 
Palmer, Isaacs and D'Silva (2001) reported over a third of the largest 125 charities continued to file 
GPFR that were not compliant with the SORP.  
The Charities Commission in England and Wales continues to have very little resource to undertake 
detailed checking of charities’ filings. Morgan (2010b) noted that problems with financial reports, 
including that the use of different versions of the SORP, means that financial statements are not 
comparable across different charities, or from year to year in the same charity (although the latter is 
more likely). A range of non-financial reporting is also required including a Trustees Annual Report 
and, since April 2008, a report on the extent to which the charity has undertaken activities to 
accomplish its objectives for the public benefit. Recent research by Morgan and Fletcher (2011) 
highlighted severe inadequacies with charities’ (non-financial) reporting of their achievements in this 
respect. Such poor financial and nonfinancial reporting is likely to undermine the publics' confidence 
and result in fewer donations to charities, and potentially jeopardise government funding into the 
sector (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009).  
In Scotland, the Registrar regularly undertakes a comparative study into ‘small charity accounts’ 
using a sample of 300 charities with income under £25,000.1 In the most recent study, they found 
that one in six charities produce GPFR which omit total income, expenditure and/or the resultant 
surplus or deficit. Approximately one in three charities files non-compliant balance sheets (Office of 
the Scottish Charity Regulator, 2010), although Morgan (2010b) notes that, if they do not balance, 
the Office of the Scottish Charities Regulator (OSCR) returns GPFR to charities prior to completing 
the filing.  
It appears that, despite the increasing demand for transparency and accountability, there remain a 
number of issues in charity reporting in the UK. Users of financial statements of North American 
charities (and not-for-profit organisations generally) also find that financial reports filed are of poor 
quality.  
Early research in the United States (US) by Froelich and Knoepfle (1996) compared charities' GPFR 
with their Internal Revenue Service (IRS) filing.2 Froelich and Knoepfle (1996) noted that the most 
frequent misstatement was in the expense categories, where organisations shifted salaries to Cost of 
Goods Sold in order to understate administration expenses. However other significant errors occur 
in defining fundraising expenses. From interview data they found that errors in filing of the IRS 990 
                                                          
1  There are approximately 25,000 charities in total registered with the Office of the Scottish Charities 
Register. 
2  Charities are defined under s.501(c)(3) of the code, may receive contributions that qualify for income tax 
deductions, and are regulated by the IRS.  
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were a result of organisations’ lack of understanding of regulators’ guidelines. Further, while 
financial statements were quite often prepared by accounting firms, the IRS 990 was filed by the 
organisation itself and errors indicated a lack of understanding of the financial statements within the 
organisation.  
Keating and Frumkin (2003) note that not-for-profit organisations’ filing of IRS 990’s is seldom 
checked by the IRS regulator (around 1.3% of filings were checked in 1999). Further, filings are 
typically one to two years out of date and contain “high rates of mathematical errors, transposed 
digits, omitted information and information inserted on the wrong lines” (Keating & Frumkin, 2003, 
p.7). Overall, a significant minority of filings omit important documents. Keating and Frumkin (2003) 
highlight the difficulties of requiring organisations to fill out a form (the IRS 990) that does not 
comply with GAAP and requires extrapolation from GPFR into a number of pre-defined categories.  
The relevance of Form 990 for users of financial statements was also raised by Froelich, Knoepfle 
and Pollak (2000). However, their study found higher levels of reliability of the totals in filed data 
than Keating and Frumkin (2003) and Froelich and Knoepfle (1996). Froelich et al. (2000) stated that 
balance sheet items were correct 99% of the time, income statements 90% of the time and that 
minor errors (+/- 10%) were unimportant. Interestingly they found that small not-for-profit 
organisations filed correctly more often than large organisations. This appeared to be related to the 
inherent relative lack of complexity. Notwithstanding the errors, Desai and Yetman (2005) noted 
that requiring charities to file the Form 990 was effective in ensuring that charities did not 
overspend charitable donations on internal compensation.  
In a study of charities that submit GPFR for reporting awards in Canada, Salterio and Legresley (2010) 
identified that organisations with the greatest problems in developing transparent annual reports 
were those with revenue between CAN$1 million and CAN$10 million. These findings built on those 
of Froelich et al. (2000). They hypothesised that charities in this range had a small number of staff 
but that they lacked the expertise to undertake the reporting process which was complex. Smaller 
organisations may well have used volunteers to develop their annual report, but their organisations 
were less complex and therefore were more easily prepared.  
Therefore, research has shown that larger organisations tend to report more transparently and meet 
regulators' demands more easily than small or medium-sized charities. Some suggest that small 
charities also meet demands better than medium-sized charities due to their simple nature (Burt & 
Taylor, 2004; Froelich, et al., 2000; Salterio & Legresley, 2010). However, the relative lack of 
expertise in small and medium-sized charities (Froelich & Knoepfle, 1996) and the voluntary nature 
of filing  (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009) may reduce the transparency of both small and medium-
sized charities.  With this in mind, the objective of this paper is to analyse how a relatively new 
regulator balanced its regulatory mandate with the issues raised internationally.  
3. New Zealand - an emergent regulator 
Calls for a charity regulator in New Zealand pre-date the Charities Act 2005 by almost two decades 
(Cordery & Baskerville, 2007) leading to a Charities Commission operating from early 2007. Unlike 
the United Kingdom which has instituted 13 charitable purposes, New Zealand chose to retain the 
four 'Heads of Charity' to define what entities could be registered: the advancement of education, 
advancement of religion, alleviation of poverty, or any other purpose beneficial to the community 
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(Charities Act, 2005 s.5(1)).   
Registration in New Zealand is voluntary, but charities will do so in order to benefit from tax-
exemption of surpluses (in pursuit of their charitable aims) and also to be able to provide a tax 
deduction to donors. Registered charities fund approximately 20% of the regulator's expenditure. 
Similar to other countries, the charities that have registered span a myriad of charitable aims, 
beneficiaries and size parameters. Charities are not required to take a specific legal form and may 
choose to be unincorporated, establish as a Charitable Trust, Incorporated Society, Limited Liability 
Company, or by a specific Act of Parliament. The liability of the members or 'owners' will be 
dependent on the incorporation chosen.  
The Charities Commission was established with 13 required functions, and a Board of between five 
and seven members. Its main purpose is to 'promote public trust and confidence in the charitable 
sector' (Charities Act, 2005, s.10.1(a)). This purpose accords with the public interest theory of 
requiring the maintenance of the public interest. 3  There have been two measures of the 
achievement of this purpose. In 2008, a survey found that 58% of people had 'high trust' in charities 
with only 7% having 'low trust' (UMR Research, 2010). However, while more people had heard of the 
Charities Commission in the 2010 survey, (67% of respondents compared with 57% two years 
before), respondents were less likely than the 2008 respondents to use the internet-based register 
to access charity information (Empathy & Charities Commission, 2010). Further, in 2010, only 55% of 
respondents had 'high trust', signalling no increase in public trust and confidence. The Charities 
Commission responded to this disappointing result by commissioning research into what attributes 
of charities cause the public to have trust in them. The results of this second survey have been 
shared widely with the charities sector to encourage better practice in communication and practice.  
Similarly to the UK Charity Act, New Zealand's Charities Commission is also expected to 'encourage 
and promote the effective use of charitable resources' (Charities Act, 2005, s.10.1(b)). Charities' 
filings are publicly available on the internet-based register. As it has been found that organisations 
that make better internet disclosures of their finances fare best in the charitable contributions 
market (Saxton & Guo, 2011)), this is an example of how the Charities Commission is informing a 
market for charitable donations and government funds. For example it also highlighted specific 
Christchurch charities which donors could support after the earthquakes that hit that city in late 
2010 and during 2011. Further, it has instigated an 'open data' project that encourages software 
developers to mine charities' annual returns. While it allows the Charities Commission to meet one 
of its ancillary requirements (to 'stimulate and promote research into any matter relating to 
charities' Charities Act, 2005 s.10(1)(m)), it is also likely that this could result in a commentator 
similar to BBB's Wise Giving to establish itself in New Zealand.  
The third major function of the Commission is the 'educate and assist charities in relation to matters 
of good governance' (Charities Act 2005, s.10(c)). This may be seen as an extension of the desire of 
the regulator to make charities more efficient. It is also an example of the compliance approach 
rather than a deterrence approach to enforcing the regulator's requirements. Since its inception the 
Charities Commission has attempted to inform charities through face-to-face and internet-based 
media.  It has an active education division which works with sector leaders to extend its reach and to 
encourage compliance. 
                                                          
3  Administrative functions include the requirements to register charities and to process annual returns. 
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This light-handed approach is also extended to charity filings. Charities are required to file an annual 
return within 6 months of their year end. This is to be accompanied by a set of financial statements. 
While the computerised annual return has a number of boxes to complete, the GPFR can be in any 
format.  There is no active checking of the filings. 
Charities' GPFR has been previously analysed in New Zealand by Newberry (1992) who found, 
similarly to Bird and Morgan-Jones's (1981) UK study, that there were consistent failures in charity 
reporting (including expensing of fixed assets, absence of appropriate financial statements and 
policies). Also similar to Bird and Morgan-Jones (1981) Newberry (1992) was concerned that many of 
these failures had not been highlighted by the charity's auditors.  More recent research undertaken 
by Hooper, Sinclair, Hui and Mataira (2008) and Sinclair (2011) also found charities' GPFR lacked 
appropriate information.  
Yet unlike the UK, New Zealand did not respond to Newberry's (1992) report by developing a specific 
charity accounting standard or SORP.4 The reasons are likely to be two-fold. First there was no 
charity regulator at the time to champion a reporting standard. Yet, even since its establishment, the 
New Zealand Charities Commission has chosen not to develop its own standards. This suggests an 
underlying constraint related to New Zealand's 'sector-neutral' or 'transaction-neutral' approach to 
its financial reporting standards setting which has operated since 1994. Under this approach, for-
profit and public and private nonprofit organisations have all been subject to the same financial 
reporting standards. Further, public sector nonprofit organisations are required to produce 
nonfinancial information with their GPFR, while private nonprofit organisations are encouraged to 
do likewise (NZ IAS-1).  
The benefits of this sector neutral approach included increased comparability between organisations 
(for example, foundations, charities with for-profit trading arms and social enterprises). It allowed 
for a common understanding of accountability across all preparers, whether they were public or 
private, for-profit or nonprofit. Also, by taking a sector-neutral approach, standard setters' effort is 
minimised in respect of the small 'market' of charity reporters compared to public and private sector 
organisations.  
Against these benefits is the drawback that New Zealand charities have been denied a regime that 
has been specifically developed for them. Accordingly, there are a number of charity-specific issues 
which are not covered by the reporting standards. These include accounting for fund-raising and the 
extrapolation of relevant ratios, and for tagged and untagged legacies and bequests.  Explanatory 
advice has been developed on the treatment of these issues and this advice is linked to the current 
GAAP (NZ IFRS), although NZ IFRS is mandatory only for large charities with assets greater than 
NZ$30million.5  
3.1 The New Zealand research 
The objective of this paper is to ascertain the impact of a light-handed charity regime on small and 
medium charities' reporting. This required us to access the publicly available data from charities’ 
annual returns to the Charities Commission, as well as the GPFR charities file contemporaneously.  
                                                          
4  While a practice guide was produced for all nonprofit organisations (R100), it was a costly publication, 
relatively unknown and had few users. 
5  At the time of writing, the NZ Dollar was worth 0.5 UK Pounds and 0.8 US Dollars. 
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This research was supported by the Charities Commission who provided raw annual return data to 
speed the initial process of selection and sorting of charities. They randomly selected 400 charities 
from their database. Two hundred of those charities had expenditure of less than NZ$40,000 and the 
other 200 had expenditure between NZ$40,000 and NZ$2,000,000. These ranges were selected as 
they are the ranges for “small” and “medium” charities in future legislative changes.6 From this list, 
we selected 300 charities for further study (150 from small and 150 from medium charities), being 
careful to include charities that were dispersed across regions and charitable aims. Following the 
downloading of GPFR from the Charities Commission (www.charities.govt.nz), we checked the 
efficacy of the charities’ answers to the questions regarding whether the charity was using a cash or 
accrual basis and also the summary financial data that the Charities Commission requests.  We also 
checked the other filings made by the charity to observe whether it complied with the charity's rules 
and for any non-financial information that might aid understanding of the charities’ activities and 
performance. Again, we downloaded this from the Charities Commission, but where charities had 
not filed non-financial information, we also wrote to the charity and requested they send us any 
non-financial data typically provided for their members and other stakeholders (for example at an 
Annual General Meeting). Data received was then included in our analysis.  
This research was undertaken between November 2010 and February 2011. It included charities’ 
GPFR for years ended 2009 or 2010 but that were filed in 2010.  
3.2 Results 
As noted, charities’ filings around the world have been beleaguered by errors and omissions.7 In this 
research, over 61% (184) of the 300 filings contained errors or omissions. Table 1 shows the general 
categories of these filing errors and the number of filings that were affected. Errors were counted as 
being present or not present (‘1’ or ‘0’). Therefore, where the same error occurred more than once 
in a charity’s filing it was counted only once, rather than as multiple occurrences.  
Table 1: Errors between financial statements and Charities Commission filing 
Error types   # of filings with 
errors  
Errors  in charities' filing 
Incorrect figures/figures do not match the underlying GPFR 72 
Missing figures  (other  than above) 28 
Misclassification / no separation between filing and GPFR 25 
000”s missing  from filing 9 
Errors  in charities' underlying GPFR 
Charities noted that they were filing cash based GPFR but GPFR was accrual based  77 
Missing equity figures from GPFR 43 
Grants disbursement as equity in GPFR, but treated as an expense in the filing.  10 
Errors in addition of GPFR 2 
 
The most common of the general errors reported in Table 1 was that the figures filed did not match 
the charity's GPFR (24% or 72 charities). The next most common error was missing figures, followed 
                                                          
6  See www.med.govt.nz for Framework announcement. 
7  See for example, from the UK: Morgan (2010b), Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator (2010), and from 
North America (the US and Canada): Froelich and Knoepfle (1996), Keating and Frumkin (2003) and Ayer, 
Hall and Vodarek (2009). 
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by figures filed with the correct numbers, but with the “000”’s missing so they were in the wrong 
category of small, medium or large.8  These errors resulted in the definitions of the charity sample 
changing due to the actual expenditure being different from that filed, so that the final sample 
included 140 small and 160 medium-sized charities (rather than 150 of each). 
 
Froelich and Knoepfle (1996) offered the explanation for errors in US filings that the person who 
completes the charity filing had little or no accounting knowledge. As filing requires the charity to 
undertake classification and reduction of the financial statements in order to fit the required 
categories, if filers lack accounting knowledge errors could eventuate. One New Zealand faith-based 
organisation noted that 21% of their treasurers did not know whether their GPFR was cash or 
accrual based and 19% of their treasurers had no qualification whatsoever (a further 14% did not 
indicate whether they were qualified or not and 15% stated they were not qualified as accountants 
but had other qualifications).9  
 
The form of the annual return template may exacerbate filing problems. For example, the term 
“gross income” created two types of errors; some charities did not disclose other income in their 
filings as, since the template asked for “total gross income”, they took the income after cost of 
goods sold figure (often called gross income), and omitted other income. This error also occurred 
with a filing whose GPFR had “gross income” as a separate heading to “other income” and hence 
“other income” was omitted. Further, some terms were ambiguous. For example, “cost of service 
provision” and “cost of trading operations” was interpreted by some charities as meaning the cost 
for them to provide their service (or for them to trade) and classified their expenses accordingly. 
Others interpreted it as the cost for them to receive services (or for them to receive goods). The vast 
majority of charities omitted figures from these two categories, disclosing separately only wages, 
depreciation and interest with the remainder of their expenses filed as “all other expenditure”, but it 
was unclear as to whether they had expenditure within this category. Keating and Frumkin (2003) 
found similar problems with the US Form 990 in that the filing requirements did not comply with 
GAAP and therefore the filer needed to ‘translate’ their GPFR to comply with the regulator's 
demands. 
 
From Table 1, GPFR errors were also significant, given that the majority of charities filed accrual-
based financial statements.  It can be seen from Table 1 that the most common error in this category 
was that charities told the regulator that their GPFR were prepared on a cash basis, when on 
examination of their GPFR we found they were actually prepared on an accrual basis (this affected 
77 charities of the 184 who filed errors, or 25.6% of charities).  
Table 2 shows more detail on where the errors lie for the 72 charities that had incorrect GPFR. It can 
be seen that, while there was a small number of charities that did not provide an Income and 
Expenditure statement or Balance Sheet, the majority of errors arose from a disagreement of 
particular totals (Equity in 31% of filings; Surplus/Deficit in 24% of filings). This is a much higher rate 
                                                          
8  The Charities Commission amended its form in early 2010 to charities to include dollars and cents rather 
than, as previously, expect them to round to the closest thousand.  
 
9  Personal email to author from Van Hout. 
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than was found by Froelich, et al (2000) in the US where balance sheets were incorrect in only 1% of 
their sample and only 1% income and expenditure statements were incorrect.   
Table 2: Misstatement errors by financial statement and charity size 
 
Main filing errors reflected in GPFR 
Total sample 
Smal
l 
% Medium % Total % 
Income and Expenditure statement was 
not filed with Charities Commission 
4 2.8% 1 0.6% 5 1.7% 
Gross income filed doesn’t agree to GPFR 20 14.3% 32 20.0% 52 17.3% 
Total expenditure filed doesn’t agree to 
GPFR 
28 20.0% 32 20.0% 60 20.0% 
Surplus/deficit filed doesn’t agree to GPFR 32 22.9% 40 25.0% 72 24.0% 
Balance sheet was not filed 3 2.1% 1 0.6% 4 1.3% 
Total assets filed doesn’t agree to GPFR 22 15.7% 35 21.9% 57 19.0% 
Total liabilities filed doesn’t agree to GPFR  20 14.3% 23 14.4% 43 14.3% 
Total equity filed doesn’t agree to GPFR  40 28.6% 54 33.7% 94 31.3% 
Charities filed accrual accounts but stated 
they were cash 
34 24.3% 43 26.9% 77 25.7% 
 
Table 2 also shows that the errors in GPFR filings by small charities are not substantially different 
from those of medium-sized charities. However, more than 76% of the errors in accounting basis 
(where charities filed accrual accounts but stated they were cash) occurred within $120,000 in 
expenditure. Further, 26% of the total errors were found in charities whose expenditure was 
between $0 and $10,000. 
Thirdly, we found that, although a majority (65.9%) of charities filed their returns within the deadline, 
these charities were likely to be medium-sized (70.5%) than small (60.8%). It can be seen in Table 3 
that 102 (34.1%) of charities filed their financial statements more than 6 months after their year end. 
Further, we noted that 30% of small charities and almost 44% of medium-sized charities filed their 
financial statements in the sixth month after their year end. The high number of filings for charities 
during the sixth month can be explained by a last minute influx to meet the submission deadline. 
The high number of filings during the seventh month is likely due to charities receiving a warning 
letter from the Charities Commission.10  
Table 3: Length of time from charity year end until filing at Charities Commission 
Time in 
months 
Small Medium  Total in sample* 
No. % No. % No. % 
1-3 8 5.7% 5 3.2% 13 4.3% 
4-6 77 55.1% 107 67.3% 184 61.6% 
7-9 48 34.3% 42 26.4% 90 30.1% 
10-12 3 2.1% 4 2.5% 7 2.3% 
>12 4 2.8% 1 0.6% 5 1.7% 
Total  140 100% 159 100% 299 100.0% 
                                                          
10  Late filers could also be de-registered, but there is a lack of enthusiasm for this, given that a charity could 
receive the benefits of registration and then de-register and distribute its surpluses however it pleases. 
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* One charity had a filing date that was before their balance date 
4. Discussion 
The New Zealand Charities regulator appears to meet the two roles identified by public interest 
theory. First, it is tasked with reducing information asymmetry in order to enhance charities' 
accountability and therefore to increase public trust and confidence.  Yet, research undertaken by 
the Charities Commission shows there has been a drop (or certainly no increase) in trust and 
confidence in charities in New Zealand (Empathy & Charities Commission, 2010; UMR Research, 
2010).  
Further, the sample of charity filings analysed in this project showed that filings with the regulator 
contain a high rate of errors, as do the GPFR that is contemporaneously filed. These errors were not 
limited to small charities, but were general across the whole sample. This finding is at odds with the 
suggestions by Salterio and Legresley (2010) and Froelich et al. (2000) who hypothesised that smaller 
charities may be better than medium-sized charities as they have simpler reporting needs. Although 
the findings are limited by the random sample chosen, these findings are more likely to show that 
small charities lack expertise (as shown by Burt & Taylor, 2004; Froelich & Knoepfle, 1996). This is 
also borne out by the informal research undertaken by Van Hout11. Another factor in the lack of 
good quality reporting is the lack of a specific charity accounting regime, brought about by the 
sector-neutral focus of the accounting regulators and the paucity of advice on charity-specific 
matters.   
However, against the similarity in small and medium-sized charities with respect to ordinary GPFR 
errors, of the 34.1% of charities that filed their returns outside of the required time, small charities 
were worse (39.2%) compared to medium-sized charities (29.5%). We noted a rush to file following 
the receipt of a reminder letter. Such reminder letters are dependent on the regulator's resources, 
yet in working with a compliance approach, the Charities Commission has chosen a method of 
operation which is likely to reduce the resources it has available to 'police' charities.  
The light handed compliance approach (rather than a deterrence approach) used by the New 
Zealand Charities Commission has prioritised proactive education and balancing of costs and 
benefits, so that small and medium charities especially have few obligations, except to file simple 
reports. While this may reduce the impost of regulation on these charities, the results of the 
research show that the light-handed regime (which has a highly voluntary nature) has not resulted in 
an increase of transparency and accountability in these charities. This is likely to be a reason for the 
lack of an increase in the donating public's trust and confidence. While Hind (2011) might suggest 
that a Charity Commission is "akin to regulating angels" the compliance approach does not currently 
appear to be working in New Zealand. The reticence of the regulator to develop a charity-specific 
reporting regime and/or the slowness of the accounting regulator to do likewise is also likely to have 
impacted the success of the regulator in meeting its aim to develop good reporting practices.  
The second reason for regulation is to create a market place (Gaffikin, 2005). By publishing the 
annual returns and financial information of all charities, the New Zealand Charities Commission 
presents data from all registered charities to any potential donor or funder. The instigation of the 
'open data' project has further delivered information to software developers and those seeking to 
                                                          
11 Personal communication with author, September 20, 2011. 
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mine the data which is available. In this, the New Zealand regulator has shown itself to be more 
proactive than other regulators, such as the Charity Commission of England and Wales that provides 
charity GPFR only on demand12 and the Scottish regulator which does not publish data at all, but 
invites interested parties to write to the charity concerned.  
A third aspect of the New Zealand regime that is not shared by UK Charity regulators is that charities 
share the cost of the regulator. This is likely to increase the risk that, when they have an interest in 
the regulator, the regulator may become captured by charities. However, although the Charities 
Commission does not trumpet it independence (as the Charity Commission of England and Wales 
does), regulatory capture does not appear to have occurred. It is likely that the diverse nature of the 
charities sector, the small registration fee, and the large number of users do not constitute a strong 
basis for regulatory capture.     
5. Conclusion   
There continues to be a debate about the appropriate role of regulation in the charity sector (e.g. 
Hind, 2011; Burt and Taylor, 2004). Regulators can represent little more than increased costs to 
those who are regulated, but, under public interest theory, they also reduce information asymmetry 
and can be used to create a more efficient charity 'market'. It appears that New Zealand's Charity 
Commission was established with these precepts in mind; however, this study has shown that the 
light-handed nature of regulation has not resulted in the regulator achieving its aims. There are high 
levels of asymmetry in the GPFR reporting, as shown by the errors in the filings made by charities 
and therefore the aim to inspire public trust and confidence is not being met, nor are a significant 
minority of charities being accountable to their users. 
Similar problems with the reliability of charities’ financial reports have been highlighted in a number 
of jurisdictions. There is a lack of GAAP-compliant GPFR filings, with charities regulators. Filings lack 
totals and segmentation especially where expenses and revenues are sensitive (e.g. fundraising). 
Sinclair (2011) suggests this can be attributed to charities’ desire to “look poor”. A second argument 
is that charities lack expertise to file appropriate financial statements. There is little research on 
capacity in this area, and it would be useful to extend this research with qualitative data on capacity 
and willingness to complete regulatory filing, not only in New Zealand, but also internationally.  
The New Zealand Charities Commission has developed methods to market charities to donors and 
thus has prioritised the marketplace rather than the reduction of information asymmetry. However, 
due to its light-handed approach, the information it provides to this market is likely to be flawed and 
undermine its position as a regulator. The findings of this research show how necessary it is for 
charity regulators to utilise minimum reporting standards, and/or to utilise deterrence methods 
rather than light-handed compliance methods, to increase the likelihood that charities will discharge 
their accountability in a transparent manner. 
 
                                                          
12  However, the Charity Commission's 2010/11 annual report notes that it is reviewing how it publishes and 
shares information on charities.  
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